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Abstract—Does the number of participants in an online 
ideation contest affect its performances? We provide an 
answer to this question by analyzing the innovations developed 
in 106 ideation contests run on an online crowdsourcing 
platform. For each contest, we investigate the association 
between the number of participants and (i) the innovation 
performance, by identifying patented products through the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (ii) the process performance, in 
terms of time to market of the innovation (iii) the market 
performance, in terms of product sales. We find evidence of a 
negative association between the numerousness of participants 
and both market performance and process performance. 
Conversely, our results show a positive association between 
participants' numerousness and innovation performance. We 
call for a proper crowd participation design, related to the 
different objectives crowdsourcing activities want to achieve, 
from an exploration-exploitation perspective. 
Keywords—crowdsourcing; ideation contest performance; 
new product and service development; online platform; contest 
participants; 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Online crowdsourcing contests are nowadays considered 
an alternative way for firms to innovate [1], [2]. In an 
ideation contest, a firm opens a call for ideas or outsources 
an innovation-related problem to a population of individuals 
(the crowd) and provides an award to the individuals that 
propose the best ideas or solutions [3]. Companies, but also 
universities and public institutions, increasingly use online 
contests as a complement to in-house research and 
development [4]. It is the case of Dell with the Dell Social 
Innovation Challenge, which collected thousands of ideas 
with world-changing possibilities. Or Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology that opened the MIT Climate CoLab, to 
devise solutions to climate change. But also governments, to 
develop innovations going from urban management to daily-
life services [5]. The benefits of these initiatives led to the 
growth of platforms such as Innocentive, that offers 
crowdsourcing services for its clients providing innovative 
solutions to a variety of problems. Although these 
communities of innovators are not a new phenomenon, the 
difference today lies in information technology. By radically 
changing the dynamics of interaction, advanced information 
technologies enable the involvement of a larger and diverse 
pool of individuals. Hence, from one side, extending the 
opportunity for innovation to a broader and more diverse 
audience [6]. This prompted the rise of a completely new 
business area, web-based intermediaries, that offer 
crowdsourcing services to companies [7]. On the other side, 
tapping such a diverse audience provides relevant benefits to 
firms, such as the collection of ideas that score significantly 
higher in terms of novelty and benefits provided than ideas 
internally conceived [8], [9]. Higher degrees of openness (i.e. 
high access to external knowledge) are positively associated 
with improved new product and service development 
performance, in terms of better knowledge, development of 
internal competencies and improved innovation outcomes 
(Füller, Hutter, & Faullant, 2011). This open method can 
bring much higher problem-solving rate [11] and creative 
ideas and contributions from users (Füller et al., 2011). Each 
single contribution, indeed, when aggregated provides better 
solutions than single experts do [12], as the “collective 
intelligence” might mitigate the effects of human biases [13]. 
Further, in most cases, the membership to the so-called 
“crowd” does not require specific skills or capabilities. This 
lack of specificity plays a valuable role in the process of new 
product development when individuals who try to resolve 
problems outside their area of expertise have usually better 
outcomes [11], [14].  
However, the observed existence of an N-effect, a 
relevant negative effect of an increased number of 
participants in a contest [15] suggests that crowdsourcing 
contests should be carefully designed in order to provide 
valuable results and paybacks. A shift of outcomes, due to a 
lack of motivation has, indeed, been observed in 
correspondence of a higher number of participants in 
crowdsourcing contests and evidence of better contest 
outcomes is associated to the number of contestants' 
reduction [16]–[19]. If we consider the two effects together, 
it is easily observable that a greater number of competitors 
creates a trade-off in performance, generating the 
phenomenon known as parallel effects [20]. The immediate 
consequence of such evidence lies in the need for companies 
to properly design and manage their crowdsourcing activities 
to properly engage the crowd. 
Previous studies investigated the crowd characteristics 
and how companies should deal with them [21]. Researches 
matched the characteristics of the crowd with key 
organizational needs [22], [23], analyzed the processes used 
to source and aggregate contributions from the crowd [6], 
[24] or concentrated on the best approach a company can 
adopt to tap a crowd [25]. Other studies concentrated on 
which individual personality traits affect quality output [26], 
[27] and the impact on crowdsourcing effectiveness, best 
practices, challenges and implications [28]. Prior studies 
[20], [29] analyzed the optimal number of contestants in 
ranked based innovation contests or in dynamic contests, 
expertise-based and with clear requirement specifications. 
However, the desirable number of contestants in online 
ideation contests, where the individuals are invited to provide 
ideas or solutions to innovative issues with no clear 
requirements, is still an unexplored issue. Ideation projects 
are, indeed, different from other typologies of contests [30] 
in terms of complexity and creativity required by the task 
[31]. For these contests, the performance (scores, 
knowledge) of participants does not represent an appropriate 
measure of outcomes: contestants work together adding 
single contributions to an overall project, thus the individual 
outcome cannot be judged aside [32]. In such contests, other 
measures of performance need to be assessed, typically 
related to the final offer (the product or service developed) 
and not to the individual skills or expertise. The aim of this 
work is to explore this issue, providing an answer to the 
question "Free entry or a restricted number of participants 
yields better outcomes in online ideation contests?". 
We contribute to extant research on the field by 
analyzing the effect of an increasing number of participants 
on three crowdsourcing ideation contest performances: (i) 
market performance, in terms of sales (ii) innovation 
performance, in terms of patents generated and (iii) process 
performance, in terms of time to market of the innovation. 
From a managerial point of view, these are extremely 
relevant aspects when deciding the configuration of an online 
ideation contest. Thus, they may help both intermediaries in 
designing effective online contests and companies in 
selecting crowdsourcing services that better suit their needs.  
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
A. Effect of participant numerousness on innovation 
performance 
N-effect has been defined as a relevant negative effect on 
the performance of an increased number of competitors, due 
to reduced motivation [15]. A shift of outcome can be 
provoked by a lack of motivation due to diluted winning 
probabilities when the number of participants increase [16]–
[19]. In such circumstances, reducing the number of 
contestants can yield a better outcome. When the award of 
the contest is directed to a sole contestant (the winner-takes-
all mechanism), a sole participant will not be incentivized in 
doing his best because of a lack of other competitors against 
being assessed. In such circumstance, adding a minimum 
level of competition would increase the participant effort 
[16], [33]. Increasing the number of competitors, however, 
dilutes participants’ effort due to decreasing chances to win 
[15], [34] leading to a downward shift in outcome 
distribution. Prior research in expert-based contests, found 
that this effect is stronger among the higher percentile of 
performance distribution [20]. In ideation contests, 
participants' performances are manifest only at the end of the 
contest, when the seeker and the community judge the ideas 
proposed. In other words, participants do not know the 
quality of submitted ideas before the end of the contest. 
Consequently, an increasing number of participants may not 
depress high-performance individuals in ideation contests. 
Further, a greater number of contestants increases the 
likelihood that at least one competitor will find an extreme-
value solution [25] and may lead to a more diverse set of 
solutions [30]. This is particularly true in ideation contests 
where technical expertise is not a relevant factor and 
participants may have different backgrounds and skills: high 
uncertainty tasks, such as new product and service 
development, are more likely to be solved when the diversity 
of the contributors is fully exploited [35] and there is greater 
technical distance between the product domain and the 
contestants‘own field of expertise [36]. Putting together the 
two effects, we expect that, in ideation contests, increasing 
participants will not depress high-performance individuals 
but conversely results in higher probability of extreme-value 
solutions, thus improving contest innovation performance. 
More formally: 
H1: There is a positive association between the number 
of participants and innovation performance in ideation 
contests. 
B. Effect of participant numerousness on process and 
market performance 
A large number of contributors is desirable to complete 
elementary tasks in a timely manner [37] when the task 
object is a routine. However, when openness increases, 
projects usually become slower and at a higher cost [38]: in 
distributed decision making, indeed, a larger number of 
individuals contributing to a single decision increases the 
decision process interval. Hence, the use of the crowd itself 
may result in an increased time to market and, if mechanisms 
are not designed in an appropriate way, projects can face a 
high risk of failure [13], [27], [39]. When the number of 
individuals participating in decisions increases, motivations 
and consequently performance may lower. A greater 
likelihood of misbehavior is expected as well, leading to a 
loss of control by the organization [13]. We expect this 
negative effect will intensify in ideation contest, due to (i) 
the multifaceted and complex nature of product development 
tasks, requiring coordination and cooperation among 
different actors (ii) the nature of ideation contests, requiring 
the conjoint work of hundreds of individuals. Thus, an 
increase in participants may likely associate with reduced 
process performances, in terms of time to market. 
Product market success may be negatively affected by 
increasing lead time [40], [41]. This is even more important 
if new product development represents a core capability of a 
firm [42], as for crowdsourcing platforms. Successful 
companies, in various industries, tend to launch new 
products more quickly than less successful competitors, to 
respond more effectively to changes in technologies and 
customer tastes, as well as to tap different customer segments 
(Sanchez, 1995; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990). Based on 
this discussion, we assume that an increasing number of 
participants in ideation contests will lead to a greater time to 
market and to reduced market performances, in terms of 
sales. More formally: 
H2: There is a negative association between the number 
of participants and process performance in ideation contests. 
H3: There is a negative association between the number 
of participants and market performance in ideation contests. 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
A. Data collection  
We collected data on the online ideation contests ran on a 
US-based crowdsourcing platform. Ideas are gathered via the 
platform website and mobile app and can be submitted by 
any individual. Once submitted, the platform community, 
composed by both the crowd and the internal staff, judges the 
ideas and decides if they are good enough for further 
development. The crowd may be composed of hundreds or 
even thousands of influencers that do not only vote for the 
ideas but also help in each stage of the development process. 
If the final product comes to be satisfactory, the platform 
commercializes it.  
In our study, we gathered data about all the product 
innovations sold by the crowdsourcing platform at a specific 
point in time. Each product represents the output of an 
ideation contest ran on the platform. For each product, the 
following information was available: price, total units sold, 
number of influencers, product category, time in store and 
length of development time in months. We matched these 
data with patent data from USPTO (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office). The platform owned 15 patents, each of 
them protects from one to nine inventions. All the 
information we gathered were publicly available. Eventually, 
we have a cross section dataset of 106 observations at the 
ideation contest (product) level. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics. 
Every single product was developed by on average 1700 
individuals, the range goes from 108 to almost 6000. The 
development time ranges from one month to two years, with 
an average development time of 5 months. One out of three 
products the platform sells are patent pending or covered by 
patents. On average, each product has sold 33,540 units, with 
a considerable dispersion. In fact, the range goes from 65 to 
621,261 units sold. The products sold are very heterogeneous 
as the price range goes from $ 1.99 to over $ 200.  
B. Variables  
For what concerns the innovation performance, we use a 
dummy variable for whether the platform filed a patent 
application for the invention. The dependent variable for 
process performance is the time to market, i.e., the number of 
months spent from the time the product entered the platform 
until it was released for sale. Finally, for testing market 
performance, we estimate a demand function, and we use the 
cumulative number of units sold on the platform. Our 
explanatory variable is the (log of the) number of 
contributors to the product.  As control variables common for 
all our models, we use a set of product category dummies to 
isolate category-specific trends and a trend variable for the 
year of launch to control for the different technological 
vintage. For the estimation of the innovation performance, 
we include the development time, as products that were 
developed for longer may be intrinsically more likely to be 
patented. For the estimation of the market performance, we 
include the price of the product -as we are estimating a 
demand function- together with the development time and a 
dummy variable for patenting because patented inventions 
can be more successful than non-patented ones as they may 
have better quality. 
C. Study Design 
In order to estimate our hypotheses, we will use two 
different specifications. First, we use a log-linear OLS 
regression, where we take the logarithm of our dependent 
variable because it is non-negative. Second, for a more 
precise estimation, we use either Poisson or negative 
binomial regression, and logit for innovation performance. 
The regression equation (1) is the following:  
  Yi =f(γIi, ΒXi,λi)        (1) 
where Y is the dependent variable of interest (respectively 
time to market, units sold, and patent), I is the number of 
influencers on the project, X is a set of product-specific 
control variables, and λ is a dummy variable for product's 
category.  
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the results of our hypotheses. The first 
three columns deal with innovation performance. Here the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for the patented 
product. In the univariate model, model 1a, an increase of 
1% in the number of influencers is associated to a 7.3% 
increase of the probability of patenting the invention. In 
model 1b, once controlling for year of launch, time to 
market, and product category, the association gets even 
stronger, 13.3%. The significance of the result does not 
change once we use a logit model – model 1c.  To conclude, 
there is a positive association between the number of 
contributors and the probability of having an innovative 
outcome, supporting hypothesis 1. 
Model 2 tests the hypothesis about process performance. 
Model 2a is a simple univariate regression, model 2b adds 
controls for category and year of launch, and model 2c is the 
same regression of model 2b but is ran using maximum 
likelihood models for count variables to account for a more 
precise distribution. For what concerns process performance, 
we can see that the coefficient for the number of contributors 
is positive and significant after controlling and using a 
different specification. A 1% increase in the number of 
influencers correlates with between a 39% and a 43% 
increase in the time the product requires to hit the market. 
Products with more contributors are associated with negative 
process performance as these products take a longer time to 
reach the commercialization phase. This lends support to 
hypothesis 2. 
In model 3, we test the associations between the number 
of influencers and the number of units sold. The coefficients 
of the univariate (model 3a) and multivariate (model 3b) 
models are negative and significant. A 1% increase in the 
number of contributors is associated on average to a decrease 
in the number of units sold from 85% to 98%. Given the 
limitations of the data and the model, the quantities need to 
be interpreted with caution. However, the significance of the 
model remains also using negative binomial regression 
(model 3c). Overall, results support our hypothesis 3: larger 
number of contributors is associated with more negative 
market performance.  
V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of our research was to deepen the understanding 
of the relation between crowd size and ideation contest 
outcomes in terms of market, innovation and process 
performance. Through a cross-sectional analysis, we found 
support for the assumption that a greater number of 
participants in an ideation contest, where the crowd 
participates at the development of new products or services, 
associates to a decreased market performance, in term of 
sales and decreased process performance, in terms of time to 
market. Conversely, we found that a greater number of 
participants is associated with higher innovation 
performance, in terms of patents. Thus, we contribute to 
academic research by depicting the participation mechanisms 
in play in ideation contests, deepening extant knowledge on 
the impact of crowd participation design on contest 
performance. Further, we enriched existing research on 
ideation contests, a specific typology of crowdsourcing 
contests, where peculiar indicators of performances need to 




TABLE I.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Number of Influencers 106 1719 1215.71 108 5783 1.000     
(2) Time to Market  95 5.2 9 1 48 0.246 1.000    
(3) Patented 106 0.34 .48 0 1 0.197 0.188 1.000    
(4) Units Sold 106 33.54 107.54 65 621.26 -0.204 -0.151 0.101 1.000  
(5) Unit Price 106 24.13 32.78 1.99 279 0.164 0.027 -0.036 -0.082 1.000 
TABLE II.  HYPOTHESES TESTING 
























OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS NegBin 
Log(Influencers) 0.073** 0.133** 0.697*** 0.431*** 0.393*** 0.632*** -0.859*** -0.989*** -1.483*** 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.114) (0.092) (0.108) (0.145) (0.240) (0.232) (0.296) 
 
Price       -0.011+ -0.008 -0.009** 
       (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
 
Year of launch  0.000 0.000  -0.001* -0.001***  -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Time to Market  0.007 0.023     -0.030 -0.054*** 
  (0.005) (0.023)     (0.020) (0.011) 
 
Patented(=1)        0.674 1.683*** 
        (0.535) (0.420) 
 
Constant -0.178 -0.715* -6.188*** -1.667* -0.061 -1.423 14.48*** 16.21*** 20.22*** 




No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Log(alpha)      -0.257   0.725*** 
      (0.173)   (0.0993) 
 
(Pseudo-)R2 0.018 0.156 0.114 0.163 0.294 0.075 0.173 0.273 0.035 
 
N 106 95 94 95 95 95 106 95 95 
 
 
This study raises a number of managerial implications. 
The observed existence of a trade-off in participants' 
numerousness in ideation contests suggests that despite the 
enthusiasm and attention paid by both scientific and 
practitioner literature, crowdsourcing should be carefully 
designed and remarkably not "over-inflated" in order to 
provide valuable results and paybacks. The immediate 
consequence of such indication lies in the need for 
crowdsourcing intermediaries to properly design ideation 
contests and to define the desired openness according to the 
company objectives. The evidence presented in this work 
suggests that different objectives related to crowdsourcing 
may represent the key for a proper design and an 
improvement of crowdsourcing services. Indeed, referring to 
the largely analyzed exploration-exploitation dichotomy 
[46], [47], it seems that inclusive ideation contests may be 
more consistent with exploration, where time constraints 
could be less pressing and where there is the ability to 
consider as many options as possible. In other words, when 
companies’ objective is to produce innovation, high 
participation ideation contests show to be a desirable 
 
aRobust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
solution. Either the company or the platform managing the 
crowdsourcing initiative will need to structure the contest in 
an open form and potentially, advertise the initiative and 
provide relevant incentives and support to participation. 
Conversely, when exploitation is in play, i.e. innovation 
requires to be turned into specific products, with tighter 
budgetary and time constraints, a more selective approach to 
crowdsourcing may be more beneficial. In such cases, closed 
and selective contest participation will yield better market 
and process outcomes. In conclusion, we call for a proper 
crowd participation design, related to the different objectives 
crowdsourcing activities may represent, in an exploration-
exploitation perspective. 
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